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Abstract
Combining models in appropriate ways to achieve
high performance is commonly seen in machine learn-
ing fields today. Although a large amount of com-
binatorial models have been created, little attention
is drawn to the commons in different models and
their connections. A general modelling technique is
thus worth studying to understand model combina-
tion deeply and shed light on creating new models.
Prediction markets show a promise of becoming such
a generic, flexible combinatorial model. By review-
ing on several popular combinatorial models and pre-
diction market models, this paper aims to show how
the market models can generalise different combinato-
rial stuctures and how they implement these popular
combinatorial models in specific conditions. Besides,
we will see among different market models, Storkey’s
Machine Learning Markets provide more fundamen-
tal, generic modelling mechanisms than the others,
and it has a significant appeal for both theoretical
study and application.
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1 Introduction
The models that are built from combining some individual
models are popular in machine learning. In a combina-
torial model, the individual models are components and
a structure is given to combine the components appropri-
ately, such as taking the average of all individuals or out-
putting the majority of the results. The structure is thus
called the combinatorial structure. The first impression of
the combinatorial structures can be given by two popular
models, ensemble learning [8] and graphical models[4].
Ensemble learning In machine learning, no individual
model can always perform the best in all cases: one model
is just suitable for a certain type of dataset or only part
of the given dataset. However, we can always make good
predictions by using multiple models instead of individual
ones. This method is called ensemble learning. For exam-
ple, for any dataset we compare and choose the algorithm
that is the most suitable for this dataset, and then make
predictions based on its result[16, 18]. By doing this our
prediction will never be worse than the best algorithm on
any dataset. Another example is the Netflix challenge[3].
The basic idea shown of ensemble learning is treating dif-
ferent algorithms as components and combining them in an
appropriate way. An ensemble learning model can achieve
high performance on the dataset without any prior knowl-
edge of it, as long as its has an appropriate way of combin-
ing its components. In other words, with a good combina-
torial structure an ensemble learning model can perform
very well.
Graphical models In a graph the nodes or cliques can
be treated as components and the edges represents how
the components are combined, therefore it’s natural to
think a graph as a combinatorial model. A component in
a graphical model always gives a marginal belief on few
random variables, which on many occasions differs from
the components in ensemble learning models that always
give their beliefs on all variables.
Generalising the combinatorial structures has a long-
term appeal for both theoretical study and application.
It can help understand combinatorial models deeply and
inspire us to build new models with novel structures.
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In the latest years, prediction markets show a promise
for becoming such a generic combinatorial model[1, 24].
Prediction markets are born to be the information aggrega-
tors and they naturally combine the agents’ beliefs through
market mechanisms[6]. The goods in the market are the
contracts associated with certain outcomes of the future
event[23]. Each agent bets for the outcomes based on its
own belief, by buying or selling some amount of the corre-
sponding goods. When the market reaches equilibrium, the
prices of goods are the aggregated beliefs for the outcomes
associated with the goods.
A prediction market also has a combinatorial structure,
and its agents are the components. Representing the
structures in prediction markets have much flexibility,
because there are quite many choices on the type of
contracts, market mechanisms, and many ways of repre-
senting agent behaviours. Therefore different views on the
market structures will result in different prediction market
models, such as Storkey’s Machine Learning Markets,
Lay’s Artificial Prediction Markets, Chen’s Market Maker
Prediction Markets, etc.
This paper aims to show how the market mechanisms
can generalise the modelling and implement these mod-
els in specific conditions. Besides, we will compare differ-
ent market models. The criterion the paper uses to dis-
cuss modelling and compare different models is how fun-
damental and generic a model can be. Based on it, the
paper thinks Storkey’s Machine Learning Markets model
provides a better modelling mechanism than the others.
Our discussion is based on the key papers [10, 20] and
[2, 14, 15]. The former two papers introduce Storkey’s Ma-
chine Learning Markets and the latter three Lay’s Artificial
Prediction Markets. Both of them build a generic model
successfully, but Machine Learning Markets model on more
fundamental assumptions than the other. They also dis-
cuss the learning process briefly. Other papers such as [6, 7]
and [11] introduce special agents, the market makers, and
market scoring rules to represent the market mechanisms
and to discuss the learning process. Although introducing
market maker can help obtain some important results, it
makes the prediction market less general than the former
models, which do not introduce any special agents.
To show how generalisation is achieved, the paper will
first review on few popular and typical models and the
structures they hold before intruding prediction market
models.
Chapter 2 introduces the popular combinatorial models
and makes a summary at the end. Chapter 3 prepares
for the following discussion by introducing some basic con-
cepts in prediction markets. Chapter 4 discusses modelling
and compares three market models. Chapter 5 talks about
learning briefly. Finally, Chapter 6 draws conclusion.
2 Models that have combinatorial
structures
Although only few models will be mentioned here, their
structures are quite typical, such as weighted average of
the beliefs, product of the beliefs.
2.1 Boosting
Boosting is a class of algorithms[19]. The idea is run the
weak learner (who has many weak classifiers) on reweighed
training data, then let learned classifiers vote. Boosting is
an ensemble learning example. There are many implemen-
tations of boosting, some famous ones are AdaBoost [9] and
Random Forrest [5].
AdaBoost The model of AdaBoost is simply weighted
average,
f(x) =
∑
i
αihi(x) (1)
Where αi is the weight for the weak classifier hi. Some-
times, hi is also called basis, hypothesis or “feature”, These
names just reflect the different angles of views on Ad-
aBoost. For this algorithm, learning seems more impor-
tant than modelling. If it wants to achieve good per-
formances, it should have good choices on the weights.
Here PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) learning
theory[21] supports AdaBoost to choose weights appropri-
ately. Despite the complicated learning process, the struc-
ture of AdaBoost is quite simple.
Random Forrest The main difference between Ran-
dom Forrest and other boosting algorithms is it introduces
stochastic properties to the model. Because of this Ran-
dom Forrest is not even treated as a boosting method. We
won’t dwell on the terminology issue. It’s more important
to see the connections between them. The structure of
Random Forrest is even simpler, where the weights are all
units,
f(x) =
∑
i
hi(x) (2)
However, although its structure seems less flexible without
weights, Random Forrest also achieves good performances.
The reason is this algorithm puts more efforts on choos-
ing bases. In fact, each basis hi(x) is a tree grown on
the training data and controlled by a random vector Θi,
hi(x) = hi(x,Θi). Similarly, Random Forrest has a simple
structure but a complex learning process.
2.2 Mixture model
Suppose there is a set of experts. Each expert performs
well only on part of the whole data domain. If a model
can give the outputs based on the most suitable experts for
the data, the model can always achieve high performances.
This kind of model is called mixture model. One example
of mixture models is mixture of experts[13].
mixture of experts To construct the mixture structure,
this model assigns different weights to each expert accord-
ing to the data points. If the experts are good to explain
the data point, their weights will be larger than others.
Therefore the structure is,
f(x) =
∑
i
wi(x)hi(x) (3)
S1t−1 S1t S
1
t+1
S2t−1 S2t S
2
t+1
Vt−1 Vt Vt+1
Figure 1: The graphical model for Product of Hidden
Markov Models
Here the weights can be treated as the posterior knowl-
edge given the observations. One special case in mixture
of experts is mixture of Gaussians, where each expert is a
Gaussian distribution and the corresponding weight wi(x)
is its responsibility for the observed data. It’s worth noting
that one graphical model, the hidden space model [4], can
represent this structure.
2.3 Product of experts
This model has a combinatorial structure in a product
form[12]. The product is always associated with graphs.
The components are thus represented by nodes or cliques.
The components give their own beliefs. When they are
combined by different types of edges (directed or undi-
rected), the final output are always in the form of the prod-
uct of these beliefs. One example is product of HMMs[13].
product of HMMs The graphical model for product of
HMMs is a mixture. It contains both directed edges and
undirected edges (Figure 1). The probabilities of variables
in this case is complex. However, in graphs the joint prob-
ability distribution has a general product form. Denote x
as the vector which contains several random variables. We
have,
P (x) =
1
Z
∏
C∈C
ψC(xC) (4)
Here C is the set of cliques in the graph, C ∈ C is a cer-
tain clique and xC is the variables contained in the clique.
The final output of the model are always derived from the
joint distribution, by either doing marginalization or intro-
ducing evidence. For example, using (4) we can write the
probability of observed variable V in this model[13], which
we will omit here.
2.4 Summary
So far this paper has introduced several models and the
combinatorial structures they represent. There are some
common features in these structures. It’s helpful to sum-
marise these features before we discuss the generalisation
of the structures.
In combinatorial structures, a component is an agent
which has its own belief on the data. Different components
(agents) act differently, by mapping the data to different
probability distributions. To show this idea more clearly,
we consider a sample space Ω and its σ-field F, and sup-
pose the data are drawn from this space (Ω,F). What the
agents actually do is they give their own probability mea-
sures on (Ω,F). Thus agent i has its own probability space
(Ω,F, Pi).
Combining these agents is actually a process of finding
an appropriate map F : {Pi} 7→ P , where P is still a prob-
ability measure on (Ω,F). We’ve already seen some exam-
ples of F . In boosting it is the weighted average. Now
because of the much flexible definition, F should not be
restricted to few forms such as weighted average or prod-
uct, although only these structures have been seen in this
paper so far.
Sometimes it’s necessary to consider the situation that
some agents may have their beliefs defined on the subspace
of (Ω,F). For example, in product models, the beliefs of
agents are only defined on the cliques; they are also called
local beliefs or marginal beliefs. There are two ways of
interpreting these beliefs. The first one is introducing the
subspace (Ωi,Fi). Now the probability space of agent i
is (Ωi,Fi, Pi), and thus Pi(Ωi) = 1. The second one is
“slicing” the probability measure using Dirac δ, so that
the probability of an event can be positive only if it is
in (Ωi,Fi). However, compared with the first way, the
subspace is not explicitly defined.
Suppose the data is drawn from the space (Ωi,Fi, P
T ),
where PT is the true probability distribution of the data,
the learning process aims to give P which is as close to PT
as possible. In combinatorial structure, P is constructed
by the beliefs of agents {Pi}. Therefore we can think {Pi}
as bases and they form a hypothesis space. That’s why
in AdaBoost a component is also called basis or hypothe-
sis. Besides, it helps understand modelling and learning in
combinatorial structures.
3 Basic Concepts in Prediction Markets
To fill the gap between the economics and machine learn-
ing, the paper will first introduce some basic concepts in
Prediction Markets.
3.1 Definitions
Definition 1. A market is a mechanism for the exchange
of goods. The market itself is neutral with respect to the
goods or the trades. The market itself cannot acquire or
owe goods. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, perfect liq-
uidity is assumed and there is no transaction fee. All par-
ticipants in the market use the same currency for the pur-
poses of trade.
Definition 2. The market equilibrium is a price point for
which all agents acting in the market are satisfied with their
trades and do not want to trade any further.
Definition 3. Prediction market (also predictive market,
information market) is a speculative market created for the
purpose of making predictions. Current prices in market
equilibrium can be interpreted as predictions of the proba-
bility of an event or the expected value of the parameter.
One good is used as currency and each of the remaining
goods is a bet on a paticular outcome of a future occur-
rence. A bet pays off if and only if the paticular outcome
accoiciated with this bet actually occurs.
Types of Prediction Market We can design different
types of bets (contracts) to realise different types of predi-
tions in the prediction markets (Table 1). For the purpose
of predicting based on probabilities, we would like to choose
the winner-take-all type.
Definition 4. Machine learning market (or artificial pre-
diction market) is a special type of prediction market. Mar-
ket participants are classifiers, which are also called agents.
The market uses the winner-take-all contract. In the mar-
ket the agents bet for the outcomes of the future events.
They buy and sell bets based on their own beliefs. Prices
in market equilibrium will estimate probabilities over the
outcomes.
Definition 5. Utility is a measure of satisfaction, refer-
ring to the total satisfaction received by a consumer from
consuming a good or service. A utility function is defined
on the current wealth, and maps the satisfaction to a set of
ordinal numbers, for which the common choice is R. Any
function is appropriate as long as it keeps the same ordi-
nals.
Definition 6. A buying function (also betting function)
represents how much an agent is willing to pay for a good
(or how many contracts it would like to buy) depending on
its price.
3.2 Notations
For the consistency this paper follows the notations in [20]
and [10].
• An outcome is an event defined on the sample space
with a proper σ-field (Ω,F). This space is mapped
to a random vector x and each out come is denoted
by y. In prediction markets each outcome is a good.
Goods are enumerated by k = 1, 2, . . . , NG. In our
discussion, {yk} are mutually exclusive. For the sake
of simplicity, k can also denote the good {yk}. If there
is only one random variable, the vector x will reduce
to variable, and NG is the number of its outcomes. If
there are N variables in x, the number of outcomes
will increase exponentially on N .
• The price of good k is denoted by ck. c =
(c1, c2, . . . , cNG)
T denotes the price vector.
∑
k ck = 1
maths its probability meaning.
• The agents are enumerated by i = 1, 2, . . . , NA. The
wealth of agent i is denoted by Wi. The beliefs of
agents on x are denoted by Pi(x). So the belief of
agent i on good k is Pi(k),
∑
k Pi(k) = 1.
• Stockholding of agent i in good k is denoted by
sik. Negative stockholding indicates the agent sells
the good, so sik can be a negative value. si =
(si1, si2, . . . , siNG)
T denotes the vector of stockhold-
ing of agent i.
• The utility of agent i is denoted by Ui. The buying
function of agent i is denoted by sik(Wi, c).
• If x contains multiple variables, they are enumerated
by j = 1, 2, . . . , J . As we discussed in Chapter 2, we
can introduce subspaces or cliques to make the beliefs
defined only on only part of the variables in x. The
subspace of agent i is denoted by Si, and the variables
in S is denoted by xSi , xSi = {xj | xj ∈ Si}. The
agent’s belief is denoted by Pi(y
Si). {ySi} are the
outcomes of xSi .
• The training points are enumerated by t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
The t-th point is denoted by Dt.
4 Modelling with Prediction Markets
The basic idea of modelling is that markets interpret the
agents’ behaviours in an appropriate way, and describing
how they interact with each other. Then the connection
between market prices and beliefs reveal the relationship
between markets and other model structures.
4.1 General market mechanism
The prices of goods are determined by the equilibrium sta-
tus of the market. Different agents interact with each other
in the way that they buy (sell) their preferred amount of
goods to (from) others. Their behaviours are interpreted
by the buying functions. When the market reaches the
equilibrium, the supply matches the demand, thus no one
would like to trade any more goods.
NA∑
i=1
si(Wi, c) = 0 (5)
Note that si(Wi, c), so there are NG equations for NG
goods. Substitute all buying functions into (5) and we
can the solve the prices for NG goods. The prices are the
aggregated probability distribution on the future events.
In many situations calculating the market equilibrium
using (5) is difficult. For the simplicity of numerical cal-
culation, [10] gives a score function which is called market
equilibrium function.
E(c) =
∑
k
(∑
i
sik(Wi, c)
)2
(6)
Here E(c) ≥ 0, and the equality holds if and only if (5)
holds. Therefore minimising E(c) will give the market
equilibrium.
Therefore, market equilibrium is the general market
mechanism that aggregates the individual beliefs in the
market. si(Wi, c) has not been specified here. Implement
the buying function in different ways will give different
models.
4.2 Model buying function – Artificial Prediction
Markets
One way to implement the buying function is we model
the buying function directly[2, 14, 15]. These papers call
Contract Details (with the example that Liberty Party win
the vote)
Reveals market expecta-
tion of . . .
Winner-take-all Costs £p. Pays £1 if and only if the Party wins
y%. Bid according to value of £p.
Probability that event y
occurs, p(y)
Index Pays £1 for every percentage point won by the
Party.
Mean value of outcome
y: E[y]
Spead Costs £1. Pays £2 if the percentage y > y∗.
Pays £0 otherwise. Bid according to the value
of y∗ .
Median value of y
Table 1: Different contract types in prediction markets
buying function “betting function”, and they think we can
choose its form arbitrarily. These papers define the buying
function in a factorial form,
sik(Wi, c) = Wiφi(k, c) (7)
Where φi(k, c) means the proportion of wealth the agent
would like to use. These papers give three types of the
proportion functions.
• Constant proportion functions
φi(k, c) = Pi(k) (8)
• Linear proportion functions
φi(k, c) = (1− ck)Pi(k) (9)
• Aggressive proportion functions
φi(k, c) =

1 if ck ≤ Pi(k)− 
0 if ck ≥ Pi(k)
Pi(k)−ck
 otherwise
(10)
The advantage of modelling the buying functions directly
is, we can suppose some functions with simple forms and
can obtain the results analytically. For example, use con-
stant proportion function and (5), we have
ck =
∑
iWiPi(k)∑
iWi
, k = 1, 2, . . . , NG (11)
This is exactly the weighted average of all beliefs, and it
interprets the structure of AdaBoost in (1). Especially, if
the weights are all the same, it interprets Random Forest
in (2).
4.3 Model utility – Machine Learning Markets
The drawback of this formulation is, however, the buy func-
tion doesn’t always have a factorial form. Besides, from
the economics point of view, the buying function is not the
foundation to interpret the agent’s behaviour[22]. Instead,
utility function is the one. According to [22], buying func-
tion is derived from the agent’s rational behaviour, that
the agent always wants to maximise its utility subject to
its budget constraint. Therefore the utility function is de-
fined on the wealth. In prediction markets, the utility has
uncertainty. The expected utility function (which is called
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility) can be written as[20],
E[Ui] =
NG∑
k=1
Pi(k)Ui(Wi − sTi c + sik)
i = 1, 2, . . . , NA
(12)
This formulation introduces a free degree: agents can
change their stockholdings by making risk free trades,
namely changing the holding from si to si +α1, and these
trades don’t affect their utilities (these utilities keep the
same ordinals). We can introduce the gauge or standardi-
sation constraint to eliminate this free degree. One choice
of the gauge is,
sTi c = 0 (13)
Then (12) is rewritten as,
E[Ui] =
NG∑
k=1
Pi(k)Ui(Wi + sik)
s.t. sTi c = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , NA
(14)
It’s worth noting that, (12) doesn’t guarantee the invari-
ances under translation, because
Ui(Wi − (si+α1)T c + sik) =
Ui(Wi − α− sTi c + sik)
(15)
The invariances can hold only when Ui(x) = Ui(x + t),
which may not always be met. In [6] and [7] the author
constructs a cost function that can always hold the trans-
lational invariances.
Maximising the utility function gives the buying func-
tion. For agent i, the buying function is,
si(Wi, c) = arg max
si
E[Ui] s.t. sTi c = 0 (16)
Taking derivatives w.r.t each sik to get the maximum. Use
Lagrange multiplier to include the gauge and we have,
Pi(k)U
′
i(Wi + sik)− λick = 0 (17)
Solve the sik = sik(Wi, c, λi) from the above and combine
it with the gauge (13), we can finally solve the buying
function sik(Wi, c). In [10] the author gives three types
of utility functions and derives the corresponding buying
functions.
• Logarithmic
Ulog(x) =
{
log(x) if x > 0
−∞ otherwise (18)
sik(Wi, c) =
Wi(Pi(k)− ck)
ck
This buying function has a linear form.
• Exponential
Uexp(x) = − exp(−x) (19)
sik(Wi, c) = logPi(k)− log ck
Because in exponential utility function we have
−e−W−x = −e−W e−x, so when taking derivatives
the wealth term in the utility function is eliminated.
Therefore the buying function do not depend on the
wealth.
• Isoelastic (η > 0)
Uiso(x) =
x1−η − 1
1− η (20)
sik(Wi, c) = Wi

(
Pi(k)
ck
)1/η
∑
j cj
(
Pi(j)
cj
)1/η − 1

Note that when η → 1, it becomes the logarithmic
case.
4.4 Implementing combinatorial structures
In former section, we have seen how prediction markets
generally work to aggregate information and interpret it in
prices of goods. Aggregation is determined by market equi-
librium, which is based agents’ behaviours described by
their utilities. There is no restriction on choosing agents’
utilities, so all agents can either have the same utility
function, or their unique ones. The market whose agents
share the same utilities is called homogeneous market, oth-
erwise it’s called inhomogeneous market. An inhomoge-
neous market is more general since it can become a ho-
mogeneous one by assigning the same utility to all agents.
However, homogeneous market can implement these popu-
lar combinatorial structures we mentioned before and can
even bring completely new structures, let alone the inho-
mogeneous market that may give much more outcomes.
The prediction market models, Storkey’s Machine Learn-
ing Markets[10, 20] and Lay’s Artificial Prediction Mar-
kets[2, 14, 15], both use homogeneous markets to form the
combinatorial structures.
Homogeneous market with logarithmic utilities
Using (18) and market equilibrium condition (5), we have,
ck =
∑
iWiPi(k)∑
iWi
(21)
It’s the same with (11) which indicates that Machine
Learning Markets can give the same results that Artificial
Prediction Markets can give.
Homogeneous market with exponential utilities
Using (19) and market equilibrium condition (5), we have,
ck ∝
NA∏
i=1
Pi(k)
1/NA (22)
It interprets the structure of Product of HMMs in (4). Here
every clique C on which the beliefs are defined is a markov
chain (Figure 1).
Homogeneous market with isoelastic utilities Us-
ing (20) and market equilibrium condition (5), we have,
ck ∝
NA∑
i=1
Wi

(
Pi(k)
ck
)1/η
∑NG
j=1 cj
(
Pi(j)
cj
)1/η
 (23)
This is not a closed form because the right side contains
prices. Besides, it’s a novel combinatorial structure, and
all the models we ever discussed don’t have such kind of
structure. Despite the lack of model examples, we can infer
some properties of this structure according to (23).
• Similar to logarithmic case, the agents that have large
weights (or that are more wealthy)Wi contribute more
to the market pricing. They would like to make the
market price close to their beliefs. In economics, these
agents are described to act like the “price makers”[6,
7, 11].
• The personal belief is not so important as in logarith-
mic case. In stead, it is the relative belief Pi(k)/ck
that really affects the prices. If an agent is wealthy
but his belief has a large deviation from others, the
market will still treat it as an “outlier” and reduce its
contribution.
4.5 Agents with beliefs on subspaces
We have discussed the agents that always have their beliefs
on the whole random vector x. This situation is true if x is
actually a random variable, which means x contains only
one entry. However, if there are multiple entries in x, it will
be more general to see the agents have beliefs only on part
of x. Introducting the agents with marginal beliefs make
a model more general since the agents are not required to
have their knowledge on all random variables now. As we
mentioned in Chapter 2, there are two ways to define the
belief on the subspace.
The paper[20] introduces the subspace explicitly and de-
fines the belief on it. Suppose x contains J variables,
x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xJ)
T , and agent i has its belief only on
those variables in its subspace Si. Then the belief is writ-
ten as Pi(y
Si). {ySi} are the outcomes of the subspace
variables xSi . Because Pi(y
Si) is a marginal probability
distribution, [20] calls the agents who have their beliefs on
subspaces the marginal agents.
The expected utility function for marginal agents is writ-
ten as,
E[Ui] =
∑
ySi
Pi(y
Si)×
Ui(Wi −
∑
ySi
si(y
Si)c(ySi) + si(y
Si))
(24)
Where c(ySi) =
∑
y′\y′Si=ySi c(y). If Si is exactly the
whole space, then the above equation is back to (12). There
is no simple representation for the prices with marginal
agents, but we know the market will give prices based on
these marginal beliefs.
4.6 Prediction markets and the map F : {Pi} 7→ P
Flexible choices of utilities (buying functions) and beliefs
make market models general. Again we can understand
market models using the map. What the combinatorial
structure provides is a map that make the agents’ beliefs
{Pi} map to the aggregated belief P . The prediction mar-
ket can implement a large number of combinatorial struc-
tures by choosing different utilities or buying functions.
In former sections we have seen how the market results
in those popular structures, such as homogeneous market
with logarithmic/exponential utilities, and the structure
that has not ever been used in any combinatorial models,
such as homogeneous market with isoelastic utilities. The
flexibility the prediction market has when it implements
the map F : {Pi} 7→ P shows that the prediction market
is likely to be a generic combinatorial model.
One interesting question is how many maps on earth
can be interpreted by the market. So far no work has been
done, but solving this question will help refine this theory
and thus it’s worth further study.
4.7 Another market mechanism – Market Maker
Prediction Markets
Besides Storkey’s Machine Learning Markets and Lay’s
Artificial Prediction Markets, another work in this field
is done by Chen et al.[6, 7]. They introduce a market
maker to help analyse good pricing and the bounded loss of
learning. In [7], the authors prove the equivalence of three
different market marker mechanisms: market scoring rule
(MSR) market maker, utility-based market maker and cost
function based market maker. It’s worth noting that, the
utility-based market maker is pretty similar to the machine
learning markets, where the market maker’s behaviour is
based on its expected utility function. However, instead
of maximising the utility function, the agents in the mar-
kets aim to maximise their expected wealth subject to the
invariance of the market maker’s utility. Suppose there is
only two agents, one is a trader (denoted by t)and another
is the market maker (denoted by m). Then the market
mechanism is written as,
max
~m
∑
k
Pt(k)(−mk) s.t.
∑
k
Pm(k)Um(mk) = C (25)
Where mk is the money the market maker spend on the
good k. The money the trader spend is −mk for the as-
sumption that the total wealth of two agents is 0. C is a
constant.
Introducing a special agent has its own drawback: it
makes the market less general because in many cases there
should be no any special agents in a market. Compared
with Market Maker Prediction Market, the Machine Learn-
ing Markets model doesn’t introduce any special agents
and thus is better to be a generic model.
5 Learning Process
The problems of learning discussed here not only refer to
the training, but also refer to the evaluation. Given one
model, people are most curious about how good it can
actually perform. For prediction markets both problems
have not been completely solved yet. However, current
results do show prediction market models have good per-
formances, at lease from the Bayesian view.
5.1 Training market models
In [10] the author discusses two ways of training the ho-
mogeneous market with logarithmic utilities, whose struc-
ture is represented by (21). Because agents’ beliefs don’t
change, only their wealths {Wi} keep updating during the
training. Therefore the training is also called wealth up-
dating in this paper. The two ways of wealth updating
are online update and batch update. Online update means
{Wi} update after every training sample. Batch update
means that each agents wealth is divided into equal pieces,
one piece for each training point, and the updated wealth
is the sum of all the updated pieces. Before training, we
need choose an appropriate initial wealths. For example,
we can choose uniform wealths {1/NA}. Denote them as
{W 0i }.
online update
W t+1i = W
t
i − sTi c + sikt = W ti + sikt
= W ti +
W ti (Pi(k
t)− ckt)
ckt
=
W ti Pi(k
t)
ckt
(26)
Where kt means the true outcome of training point Dt,
and because of the standardisation constraint, sTi c = 0,
we have W ti − sTi c + sikt = W ti + sikt . Train the market
with T data points, we will get the final wealth for each
agent Wi = W
T
i .
batch update
Wi =
T∑
t=1
[
W 0i
T
+
W 0i
T
(Pi(k
t)− ckt)
ckt
]
=
W 0i
T
T∑
t=1
Pi(k
t)
ckt
(27)
5.2 Bayesian view on training
Now we think the agent’s personal belief in another way.
Suppose agents are represented by a random variables
z, which has NA outcomes i = 1, 2, . . . , NA. The joint
portability distribution over the random vector (xT , z)T
is denoted by P ′(x, z). Then each agent’s belief Pi(k) is
the conditional probability P ′(x = k|z = i), namely we
have Pi(k) = P
′(x = k|z = i). For simplicity we write
P ′(k|i) = P ′(x = k|z = i). In fact, we treat agents as the
outcomes of a latent variable z. If we marginalise it on z,
we will obtain P ′(k).
The market prices form another probability distribution
on x, ck = P (k). Note that P
′ and P are two different
probability measures on the sample space. P ′ is directly
obtained by the sum rule, while P represents an arbitrary
aggregation process. Only in one special case we have
P ′ = P : the aggregation process is the (weighted) sum
over all agents, which is the same as marginalization. The
homogeneous market with logarithmic utilities just provide
such a process. When P ′ = P we have,
P (k) = P ′(k) =
∑
i
P ′(k, i)
=
∑
i
P ′(i)P ′(k|i) =
∑
i
P ′(i)Pi(k)
(28)
Where P ′i can be treated as the weight of agent i, Wi = P
′
i
(suppose Wi has been normalised). This is exactly the
Bayesian learning in [4]. Now we consider the learning
process and introduce training data.
P (k|D) =
∑
i
P ′(i|D)Pi(k|D) (29)
We see that Wi = P
′(i|D). So Wi is the responsibil-
ity of agent i for data D, or the posterior probability of
agent i given data. In Bayesian learning, as the number of
data points increases, the posterior distribution P ′(z|D)
becomes sharp. After enough training points, the agent
whose belief is the most close to the true probability dis-
tribution will gain the largest weight, while all the others
have nearly zero weights. Therefore, in the homogeneous
market with logarithmic utilities, finally the prices will be
made by the best agent.
In fact we can understand this Bayesian process as a
Bayesian model averaging [18]. It is often used to select the
best algorithm for a given dataset, among a number of algo-
rithms, but it can select only one algorithm[17]. Strict de-
duction shows that, with infinite number of training points
T → ∞, if the hypothesis space contains the true proba-
bility distribution, Bayesian model averaging can select it
out; if the hypothesis space doesn’t contain the true one,
then it will select the distribution that is the most close to
true one.
Therefore, with enough points, the homogeneous market
with logarithmic utilities will perform the same good as the
best agent in the market. They have the same loss, which
means how well the market can perform will depend on
how good the best agent is.
5.3 Further discussion
Bayesian learning seems have solved the learning problem
elegantly, but in fact it’s too ideal. The so-called “with
enough points” is a condition that can never be met, be-
cause we need T → ∞ training points. It will be much
more significant to answer how good performance the mar-
ket can achieve with finite or few training points. In fact,
this question is where some learning theories originate,
such as Vapnik-Chervonenkis theory.
For some models, such as boosting, this question has
been well solved. So if the market mechanism results in
boosting algorithms, we can know the performance of the
market. However, we cannot know its performance if the
market gives other combinatorial structures. What we
want to know is whether it’s possible to have a general
idea on the performance of market, regardless of the com-
binatorial structure it represents.
Some work has done by Chen et al. and their discus-
sion is based on introducing the market maker. In [6] they
show that “any cost function based prediction market with
bounded loss can be interpreted as a no-regret learning al-
gorithm”. Besides, in [7] they have shown the equivalence
between cost function based prediction market and util-
ity based prediction market under some conditions. As
we mentioned before, it’s possible to connect the market
marker model and Machine Learning Markets model. For
example, we can specify an agent in the machine learn-
ing markets as a market maker. If it’s true, the results of
the market maker model can be used on Machine Learning
Markets, making this model better and more general.
6 Conclusion
Prediction markets have shown a huge potential of becom-
ing a generic combinatorial models. In this review, we
see how prediction markets provide flexible mechanisms
to implement different combinatorial structures. By as-
signing specific utilities or buying functions to each agent
and using market equilibrium condition, Artificial Predic-
tion Markets and Machine Learning Markets can give not
only the structures of some well-known models (logarith-
mic utilities implement averaging structure, and exponen-
tial utilities implement product structure), but also ones
that have never been used (isoelastic utilities). More gen-
erally, prediction markets provide many optional choices of
the map F : {Pi} 7→ P where each F stands for a combina-
torial structure. Therefore the prediction market models
are general.
This paper has first compared two prediction market
models, Artificial Prediction Markets, which models the
buying functions, and Machine Learning Markets, which
models the utilities. Both of them perform well in gener-
alising combinatorial models. However, because utility is
more conceptually fundamental than buying function and
it can give buying function naturally, Machine Learning
Markets model is more general and more elegant, than
Artificial Prediction Market. Besides, the paper also dis-
cusses another market model, called Market Maker Pre-
diction Markets. This model introduce a special agent,
the market maker, to help analyse the market mechanism
and pricing (namely learning) process. Admittedly some
significant results are obtained. However, introducing the
special agent makes it less generic than the former two
models, which is a big problem. Therefore, based on the
criterion that a better model should be more fundamental
and more general, the paper holds the conclusion that Ma-
chine Learning Markets is the better one. A possible work
might be trying to find the connections between Machine
Learning Markets and Market Maker Prediction Markets,
in order to use these significant results to refine Machine
Learning Markets model.
A brief discussion on the learning process from Bayesian
view shows that market models (Machine Learning Mar-
kets) do have high performances and thus are attractive to
practitioners.
Apart from the modelling and learning theories, Ma-
chine Learning Markets model shows a promise in practical
implementations. In the market all agents have the same
priority, and their behaviours are independent with each
other, only based on their own utilities. Parallelisation
is therefore able to be used in the model, which shows a
long-term appeal when people need to deal with more and
more data.
In sum, prediction market models are becoming the
generic combinatorial models. Among different mar-
ket models, Machine Learning Markets has a particular
promise of becoming the best market model, for it builds
the model more general and elegantly, and gives attractive
applications in the future.
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